One thing I like about philosophy is how often I can find real-world applications for it. I guess thats because its so abstract, compared with, say (to pick another of my interests), zoology. It is very unlikely that I will ever find a use for my knowledge that elephants have two distinct charging behaviours, one when theyre charging to threaten and the other when they intend to kill. Cats and dogs and rabbits just arent the same. On the other hand, its a rare week when I dont have to think about essentialism, or game theory, or survivorship bias, or some other concept at the intersection of philosophy and mathematics, for some reason or another.
Recently I came across a singularly important philosophical paradox. Oh, its importance isnt instantly obvious. To be honest, at first glance it looks footling, one of those little quibbles that just go to show philosophers need to get out in the fresh air a bit more. Ill take you through it first, but let me assure you: the deepest, most fundamental question in global politics for the last thirty years hangs on the resolution to this paradox. But I have to tell you what the paradox is first, before I can explain how. Its called the Mere Addition Problem, or alternatively the Repugnant Conclusion. Here to explain it is the philosopher Julia Galef (whose work I regret not discovering years ago):
In case you scrolled past that without playing it, the problem is the three contradictory premises, all of which seem reasonable, but which cant all be true. Galef phrases them as follows:
- Creating new people with lives worth living doesnt make things worse.
- Increasing total and average happiness makes things better.
- A smaller number of very happy people is preferable to a larger number of unhappy people.
Consider three possible worlds. First, a world with a small number of very, very happy people. Second, a world with that same number of very, very happy people, plus a similar number of other people who are just kind of contented, but not actively unhappy. Third, a world with the same total number of people as the second world, who are all just a little bet less happy than the very-very-happy people but a whole lot happier than the kind-of-contented people. Now according to premise (1), the first world is no better than the second world. According to premise (2), the third world is better than the second world. But that means the third world is also better than the first world a larger number of less happy people is better than a smaller number of very happy people which contradicts premise (3). Look, it all makes sense with Galefs visual aids, I promise.
This is called the Mere Addition Paradox because all youre doing with premise (1) is merely adding people to the world, who just happen not to be as happy as the people already in it. Its called the Repugnant Conclusion because, if you go through the same reasoning several times over, you end up concluding that a world with a vast population so unhappy they have just one thing keeping them from suicide is better than a world with a tiny population whose lives are healthy, fulfilling, exciting, and blissful. Mind you, given only those premises, it is possible to cheat our way out of the paradox, because there are a couple of additional premises which are necessary for the Repugnant Conclusion to follow:
- The law of transitivity applies to goodness.
- There is no threshold of happiness (above the zero point of Id rather be dead) at which this logic stops working.
I say cheat our way out because, although we can avoid the Repugnant Conclusion if either one of these is false, either way we end up not making much sense. To falsify premise (5), we would not only need to quantify a threshold of happiness below which the logic did stop working; we would also need to specify which of the other premises broke down at that threshold and why. So that gives us a whole lot of extra work figuring out how to quantify happiness, and gets us no closer to a solution than we already were.
Premise (4) looks more promising at first sight. The law of transitivity is a jargony, technical sort of term; it looks like it means something complicated and esoteric. Actually all it means is the simple rule that if Thing A is better than Thing B, and Thing C is not better than Thing B, then Thing A must also be better than Thing C in whatever sense we might be using the word better. So, for instance, if democracy is better than absolute monarchy, and military dictatorship is not better than absolute monarchy, it follows that democracy is better than military dictatorship. If solar power is better than gas, and coal is not better than gas, it follows that solar power is better than coal. If Wonder Woman is better than Batman v. Superman, and Suicide Squad is not better than Batman v. Superman, then Wonder Woman is better than Suicide Squad. If teriyaki beef is better than cheese-on-toast, and baked beans are not better than cheese-on-toast, then teriyaki beef is better than baked beans. Without a rule like that, wed have to compare every possible pair of alternatives independently to determine which was the better of the two. It would be impossible to generalize about what makes one thing better than another, and hence meaningless to compare hypotheticals like the made-up worlds in the Mere Addition Problem. Any attempt at reasoning about values would boggle. Premise (4) stands.
Let me now clear up a further red herring an attack on the problem which does make a certain amount of sense but doesnt remove the Repugnant Conclusion. It goes Im not a utilitarian. Morality isnt the same as maximizing happiness. I, for instance, think morality is about maximizing trust rather than happiness. The reason this doesnt work here is that the Mere Addition Problem is about goodness rather than morality. These two concepts are related but not the same. Morality is an intensely practical matter; it poses questions of the form What shall I do? If I answer Earn peoples trust, well, the way to do that is to consistently do good for other people, so Im still left asking What counts as good? which is the question that the Repugnant Conclusion raises problems for.
If you dont make the subtle distinction between goodness and morality, you might think you had found another way to disarm the Repugnant Conclusion: Creating worlds and manipulating peoples happiness by way of experiment is deeply immoral anyway. Id be inclined to agree. You, the Manipulator of Worlds, might personally know that you would never intentionally use your power to create misery, but you cant reasonably expect your subjects who live or die, rejoice or suffer, at your merest whim to have the same certainty. By holding that power at all you create a situation in which you cannot be trusted. But the Repugnant Conclusion doesnt in fact depend on the supposition that you (or anyone) are responsible for the existence of the world, its people, or their happiness. The unfortunate language used, of creating worlds and adding people to them, is not necessary to the Problem. As long as the posited worlds and people could conceivably exist, were still faced with the question Which one would be better?
So were back to Galefs three premises. Which one is wrong? Im going to eliminate premise (3) from the get-go. If the words good and better mean anything at all, then a world with a small happy population is better than a world with a large miserable population. Premise (3) is true. The Repugnant Conclusion is false. To call misery better than happiness is to talk nonsense. If thats goodness, give me evil.
There remain premises (1) and (2), and this is where things begin to get political. I maintain, and will demonstrate, that the great global political question of my lifetime comes down to which one of these premises is false. I believe that policy-makers have chosen the wrong one, and that the disasters of recent decades global warming, the financial crisis, Donald Trump are all partly, and some entirely, consequences of that choice.